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CRIMINAL LAW
PSYCHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY AS A FACTOR IN GRADING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: DIMINISHED CAPACITY, DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LIKE
GEORGE E. DIX*
INTRODUCTION
During early 1969, the trial of Sirhan B. Sirhan
for the killing of Senator Robert Kennedy provided a sixty day, $900,000 public demonstration
of California's efforts to integrate creatively contemporary psychological knowledge with criteria
for criminal responsibility. The demonstration
did not prove an unqualified success. Testimony
by defense expert Doctor Martin M. Schorr, a
clinical psychologist, that Sirhan lacked the
capacity to entertain the state of mind required
under California law for murder was translated by
a prosecutor for newsmen as, "If you hate a guy a
little bit and kill him it's murder; if you hate a
guy a lot and kill him, you're sick."' When Doctor
Bernard L. Diamond, well-known for his writings
on law and psychology and his personal participation in leading California cases, 2 presented his
theory that Sirhan had shot Senator Kennedy
while in an abnormal state of mind induced by
flashing lights and mirrors at the scene, he cautioned the jury that his theory was "an absurd,
preposterous story, unlikely and incredible, which
in a unique case such as Sirhan's does raise the
gravest problems of clinical proof and credibility." 3
In his dosing argument to the jury, the prosecutor
declared, "I have heard that Charles Dickens
wrote in a book that 'the law is an ass.' I think the
law became an ass when it let the psychiatrist get
his hand on it. It would be a frightening thing for
justice to decide a case of this magnitude on
whether [Sirhan] saw clowns playing patty-cake
or kicking each other in an ink blot test." 4 After
sixteen hours and forty-two minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to first
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizuna State University.
I N.Y. Times, March 12, 1966, at 24, Col. 3.
2See the discussion of People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d
716,336 P.2d 492 (1959), at note 81 infra.
3N.Y. Times, March 28, 1966, at 19, Col. 1.
4Id., April 15, 1966, at 18, Col. 1.

degree murder; the next week the same jury imposed the death penalty. 'qthink the jury took the
testimony of the psychiatrist and psychologist into
consideration fairly", one juror told newsmen, "but
the feeling was that they contradicted each other
and even themselves from time to time." '
The obvious difficulty, experienced by both
participants and observers in the Sirhan trial in
evaluating testimony as to Sirhan's state of mind
stems from the controversy surrounding California's so-called diminished capacity rule' under
which evidence of the defendent's state of mind
was admitted. California's rule is, however, merely
one possible answer to a broader question that has
troubled the criminal law for many years: Is proof
of the defendant's psychological abnormality, that
is, the manner in which he differs from the rational,
7
utilitarian man of the classical criminologists,
admissible other than for the purpose of establishing the "insanity" defense and may it be considered
by the trier of fact in assessing criminal liability?
The issue is, of course, intimately related to the
5Arizona Republic, April 25, 1966, at 14, Col. 2. An
interesting discussion of Sirhan's psychological condition as well as the trial testimony and tactics is KAnSER,
R.F.K. MUST Dix! (1970).

6This is the position that evidence of psychological
abnormality is admissible to disprove the state of mind
required for the crime, adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202
P.2d 53 (1949). Wells is discussed in the text accompanying note 29 infra, and the diminished responsibility rule is discussed in the text accompanying note 62
fra.
7
This is not an indisputable definition of psychological abnormality. Many mental health professionals
would, of course, argue that the classical utilitarian
man would not be "normal," if indeed he could be
found at all. Some might argue that psychological abnormality, assuming it can be defined, should not be
legally significant in determining criminal liability unless it is of a given degree of severity, i.e., enough to
constitute "mental illness." But since the matter is
wide open in this regard and the criminal law assumes
the rational utilitarian man, psychological abnormality
seems best defined as any deviation from this model.
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integrate grading and the psychology of the offender. The question may arise when such evidence
is offered by a defendant, when instructions are
requested directing the jury to consider such evidence and telling them how to do so, and when a
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict.
The attempt to integrate grading of offenses and
the psychology of the offender is by no means a
recent development; it has received relatively extensive consideration by both courts and commentators. In its only consideration of the matter,9
the United States Supreme Court in 1946 refused
to overturn, either as a matter of evidentiary law
or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, the
decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia that a trial court in a homicide prosecution had not erred in refusing to instruct the
jury to consider the accused's mental illness in
determining whether he had harbored "malice
aforethought" at the time of the alleged killing.
Suggesting that experience had not clearly demonstrated the fallacy of the position taken by the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declined
to express an opinion on the merits of the issue and
relegated the matter to legislative action or the
discretionary powers of the lower courts."0
The issue seems, however, to have experienced a
recent revival in the state appellate courts. Several
courts, for example, have recently held such proof
8It has been suggested that insofar as the matter
has been litigated in American courts, it applies only to
homicide cases. State v. Gilmore, 242 Ore. 463, 469 n.
2, 410 P.2d 240, 243 n. 2 (1966). It has also been suggested that the "diminished responsibility" doctrine is,
in fact, applied only in capital cases as a means of voiding a death penalty not voidable on other grounds.
United States v. Hazeltine, 419 F. 2d 579, 581 n. 3 (9th
Cir. 1969). Although it is true that the appellate cases
often involve homicide cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, there is no doctrinal reason
why it could not be raised in other situations. In California, for example, several of the major cases have
in olved homicide convictions in which the death
penalty was not imposed. See People v. Conley, 64
Cal.2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966);
People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 794, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal.

Rptr. 271 (1964). The cases state that the California
Supreme Court does not disapprove of its "diminished
capacity" rule being applied in nonhomicide cases. See
People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949)
("leading case," in which court approved of such evidence in prosecution for assault by a prisoner); People
v. Gentry, 257 Cal. App.2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235
(1968) (Diminished capacity unsuccessfully invoked in
bad check case).
Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1916). See
note 47 infra.
10 328 U.S. at 476.
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not entitled to evidentiary significance despite
earlier language in their decisions suggesting that it
would properly be considered 1 On the other hand,
one state court has apparently assumed that constitutional considerations required that proof of
psychological abnormality be given full evidentiary
significance in regard to the state of mind of the
defendant at the time of the alleged offense' 2
Despite the significant amount of literature on
the subject," the recent flurry of attention the
problem has received in the popular press as well
as in the case law and legal commentaries suggests
that a reexamination is in order.
Doctrinal work in this area must be done with
frank acknowledgement of the difficulty of relating
1 Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 171
S.E.2d 166 (1969) (Offer of psychological evidence as
to whether defendant acted with malice aforethought
or whether he premeditated properly refused) (Does
not mention language in Dejarnette v. Commonwealth,
75 Va. 867, 880-81 (1881):

there are, doubtless, cases in which, whilst the
prisoner may not be insane.., yet he may be in
that condition from partial aberration or enfeeblement of intellect which renders him incapable of
the sedate, deliberate and specific intent necessary
to constitute murder in the first degree);
Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 162 N.W.2d 77 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969) (disapproving any
suggestion in Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W.
596 (1901), that mental abnormality short of insanity
was relevant to guilt). Cf. Hashfield v. State, 247 Ind.
95, 210 N.E.2d 429 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921

(1966), making clear that language in Sage v. State,
91 Ind. 141 (1883) (A defendant has a right to have
his mental condition at the time of the crime put before
the jury) did not authorize a defense of "partial insanity."
12Shaw v. State, 106 Ariz. 103,471 P.2d 715 (1970),
cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1971). In
dicta, the Arizona Supreme Court indicated that the

bifurcated trial procedure, which separated the trial
of "guilt" from that of "insanity," violated the due
process rights of the accused. The legislative intent was
that evidence of mental illness be admitted only at the
second trial on the sanity issue, the court reasoned, and
since this deprived the accused of his right to have all
relevant evidence as to his state of mind introduced at
the first trial (including any proof of mental illness),
the procedure must fall. For a discussion of the case
and the issues raised by it, see Dix, Mental Illness,
Criminal "Intent," and the Bifurcated Trial, LAW AD
THE SocrL ORDER 559 (1970).
"3See, e.g., S. GLuTEcK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
Cp -rhALLAw 199-208 (1925); M. GUTTM CER &
H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHiATRY AND THE LAW 426-33
(1951); R. PERKINGS, CamrsAL LAw 878-83 (2d ed.
1969); H. WEmOPEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CaIMNAL DEFENSE 175-95 (1954); Keedy, Insanity and

Criminal Responsibility, 30 HAtv. L. REv. 535 (1917);
Keedy, A Problem of First Degree Murder: Fisher v.
United States, 99 U. PA. L. Rxv. 26 (1950); Taylor,
Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A
Commentary on Fisherv. United States, 34 CAL. L. REv.
625 (1946); Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal
Intent, 24 ILL. L. REv. 505 (1930).

1971]
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it to reality. While the relationship between formal
doctrine and the administration of the law-in-fact
is still a highly uninvestigated area, there is a
growing body of literature that suggests what every
practicing lawyer knows: the relationship between
doctrine and administration is neither as simple
and direct nor as important as has traditionally
been postulated.1 4 But this does not mean that
doctrinal analysis is of no value or that more
careful consideration of the empirical effects of
doctrinal alternatives cannot assist the criminal
justice system in accomplishing its goal.
I. SuBJEcTIVE AND OBJECTrvE FACTORS IN
DETERMINING CRnMNAL LIABILITY

The use of psychological abnormality is only
one of numerous ways in which the substantive
criminal law might investigate the subjective state
of mind of the offender. To place the issue of psychological abnormality in proper perspective, it is
necessary to review briefly the significance of the
offender's mental state in criminal liability doctrine. This can best be done by positing two polar
models and then examining the extent to which
these models have been accepted in formal doctrine.
A. The Models of Liability
The use of models is often helpful to the understanding of the relationship between apparently
conflicting approaches of the law to related issues. 5
By carefully examining the choices which must be
made on each issue, variations in the way the
choice is made can often be better understood. This
is as true with the substantive criminal law as
with other areas. The models, for the sake of convenience, can be labeled the "subjective model of
criminal liability" and the "objective model of
criminal liability."
1. The Subjective Model
The subjective model emphasizes the characteristics of the particular offender. Liability is
124
For work regarding the effect of the doctrinal
formulation of the insanity defense, see A. GornsTEiN,
THE INshrr DEFENSE (1967); R. SIMON, THE Juny
AND THE DEFENSE OF NsANIrry (1967).
15
H. PACKER, THE LIMIrs oF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 152-54 (1968), develops the value of models as a
way to discuss a system which must accommodate competing value systems and the value systems themselves.
Such an analysis focuses attention on the overall competition between or among value systems and the need
to examine each aspect of the process to determine
what choice has been made at that point.

properly imposed only if it is established that (1)
the individual has violated or endangered a social
interest, (2) the individual's actions or failure to act
violated a rule of which the offender was aware,
(3) the offender himself acknowledged at the time
that this rule "should" have been obeyed, and (4)
the offender's decision to violate the rule was not
significantly influenced by factors other than the
philosophical decision to violate the norm. This
model, of course, emphasizes "moral culpability"
by authorizing liability only when the offender has
voluntarily, in the broadest sense of the word,
violated a norm which he himself recognized as
deserving his adherence. It also serves the utilitarian function of restricting the imposition of
punishment to those cases in which it is most likely
to serve the preventive objective. Assuming that
the preventive function is performed by specific
and general deterrence, the subjective model also
represents reliance upon the assumption that
punishment can only be effective upon those who
are aware of its existence, who are aware of their
choice to incur liability or not, and who are free
from any influence that renders freedom to exercise this choice nonexistent.
2. The Ojective Model
The objective model, on the other hand, emphasizes the threat which an individual poses directly
to social interests protected by criminal sanctions.
Liability is properly imposed if the individual in
fact has demonstrated that he poses a threat to
social interests, that is, if it is established that the
individual has, by his actions or omissions, violated or endangered a social interest.
The objective model may rest upon acceptance
of the retributive justification for punishment:
punishment is justified if the individual has caused
18
the damage or danger that the law prohibits.
But it may also represent a conclusion that imposing objective liability serves the preventive function of the law. Imposing liability without regard
to state of r~nd may serve the "educating" or
"moralizing" function by demonstrating and
emphasizing social disapproval of the action. 7 It
may also serve to deter those who might otherwise
16

See e.g., P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL

51 (1963).
GUILT
1

7 For a good summary of the terminology involved
and the issues presented by the policy difference, see

Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,
Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REv.
550 (1969).
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rely upon being erroneously found not responsible
by virtue of their subjective state of mind 8
Substantive criminal law doctrine represents a
series of compromises between these two models of
liability. Doctrinal development has been piecemeal and, many would argue, less sophisticated
than in most other areas of American law. But the
problem of consideration of psychological abnormality cannot be adequately evaluated without an
adequate understanding of the various compromises at other points which the law has made.

Although there is historical evidence that it initially required a bad motive or purpose, demand
that the criminal law be used to protect society
against individuals who are less culpable but
nevertheless dangerous has led to a dilution of the
evil mind requirement to the point of requiring
only an awareness of acts, circumstances, or the
occurrence of results that are evaluated objectively as antisocial.20 The requirement is now one
of conscious awareness alone. As Helen Silving has
stated:
The law proceeds on the assumption that any given
'intentional act' is ascribable to a particular 'intent,' which psychologically appears as an isolated
event or at least as an event separable from other
psychological phenomena. It thus singles out
from the dynamic continuity of a human life one
act and a particular intent, directed towards it or
its consequences. Inquiry into total personality
development, which culminated in the particular
act in issue, indeed even into the specific motive
which produced the intent to carry out the act, is
barred."

B. DoctrinalChoices Between the Models

Liability for criminal punishment is traditionally
said to require that the individual have entertained an "evil" mind and have translated that
state of mind into action or, in a limited number of
situations, inaction. But the general state-of-mind
requirement 19 for liability is itself a compromise.
18
See, e.g., Andenaes, General Pre-vention, 43 J. CRUU.
L. C. &P.S. 176, 179-81 (1952).
19Although the use of the terms inens rea, general
intent, and specific intent has given rise to much confusion, they are used here in what is probably the least
confusing manner. Mens rea means the state of mind
required by the substantive law for liability; this varies,
obviously, from offense to offense. General intent means
purpose, knowledge, or recklessness with regard to each
element of the offense. Whether general intent is part
of the mens rea for any crime depends upon the substantive law definining that crime. Specific intent
means a substantive requirement of a state of mind in
regard to something that is not itself an element of the
offense. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMNAL LAW 73945 (2nd ed. 1969).
There is some indication that psychological abnormality might be relevant in the determination of
whether a criminal defendant has committed a "willed
act." Thus an act committed while unconscious does
not give rise to criminal liability. See People v. Wilson,
66 Cal.2d 749, 427 P.2d 820 59 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1967);
State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969).
But it seems clear that if the alleged unconsciousness
was purpoitcJly caused by a psychological abnormality
that might give rise to legal "insanity," the effect of it
must be judged by the insanity criteria and not by the
"unconsciousness" test. See State v. Wilson, 66 Cal.
2d 749, 756 n.2, 427 P.2d 820, 825 n. 2 59 Cal. Rptr.
156, 161 n. 2, (1967). It has also been asserted that if
an act was "involuntary," as by reason of alcoholism,
the defendant has not thereby committed an "act"
within the meaning of the traditional actus reus requirement. Tao, Legal Problems of Alcoholism, 37 FORDHAMI
L. RFv. 404, 407 (1969). As in the case of the "unconsciousness" defense, however, doctrinal order seems to
demand that this rule be limited to "involuntariness"
caused by factors that could not be within the ambit
of the insanity defense. In any case, insofar as psychological abnormality gives rise to "unconsciousness" or
"involuntariness" within the meaning of these doctrines, it results in absolving the accused of criminal
liability. Since this is an all-or-nothing proposition, it
has little relevance to the present problem, the grading
of the liability of one admittedly criminally liable.

In addition, no conscious acknowledgement of the
wrongfulness of the situation is usually required
for liability; even an awareness of the law's formal
proscription seldom need be established.
Moreover, reluctance to extend every criminal
trial into a full examination of the offender's mind
has prompted the law to grant the prosecution the
benefit of the presumption that every man intends
the natural consequences of his actions.2 Both in
2

s See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRItrun'izs or CRim83 (2nd ed. 1960). But see Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MLnN. L. REv. 1043, 1059
NAL LAW

(1958).

21Silving, Psychoanalysis and the Criminal Law, 51

J.

CRIM.

L. C. & P.S. 19, 24 (1960).

Some courts, however, fail to recognize this limitation. See, e.g., State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 437 462
P.2d 729, 736 (1969): "Authority holds that the word
intentional is synonymous with 'voluntary'"
n The presumption is often invoked in appellate
cases to sustain a verdict under circumstances containing adequate circumstantial proof of the requisite state
of mind. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 157 Conn. 351, 254
A.2d 447 (1969); State v. LeVier, 202 Kan. 544, 451
P.2d 142 (1969). But in some cases it is invoked where
adequacy of proof of intent is questionable. In State
v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 593, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958), for
example, the defendant was charged with arson which
the court acknowledged required intent to burn the
structure. The defendant admitted having lighted a
candle under a stairway of the structure, holding the
candle to an inner tube, trying to squeeze the fire out
when it began to hiss and bubble, and finally running
away. In sustaining the convinction, the court held
that the fire was the "natural and probable result" of
the acts which defendant's admissions proved, there
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substance and in manner of proof then, the general
inens rea requirement represents a significant compromise between the subjective and objective
models of liability.
Deviations from the general state of mind requirement complicate the picture. So-called "strict
liability" offenses-in which general intent is not
required in regard to one or more elements of the
offense 23 -are relatively common, although inadequate judicial analysis often makes the exact
requirements for liability difficult to determine.
Requirements beyond general intent-so-called
"specific" intents-usually represent, where they
exist, a swing towards the subjective model. But
such specific intents have developed piecemeal in
regard to a number of attempt-like offenses, and
no overall consistent approach is generally discernible.
The compromises and their variety become even
more obvious in an examination of the traditional
defenses to criminal liability. The rule that only a
reasonable mistake of fact can negate a "general"
intent has as its results the potential imposition of
liability for a failure to live up to an objective
standard.14 The limitation often imposed upon the
availability of intoxication as negating state of
mind-that it too may only negate a specific
was a presumption that he intended such results, and
the jury reasonably concluded that the defendant failed
to rebut this presumption by raising a reasonable doubt
as to his state of mind. But see State v. Lundstrom, 285
Minn. 130, 171 N.W.2d 718 (1969) (Evidence, including battery upon wife, left substantial doubt as to
whether defendant had intended death of wife which
followed battery). The presumption may also be used
as a compromise in situations involving strong policy
support for strict liability. See People v. Vogel, 46
Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d850 (1956), rejectingthegeneralrule
that a bigamy defendant's awareness of the facts making his marriage bigamous is irrelevant, but holding
that showing the second marriage is part of a prima
facie case and the defendant bears the burden of proving lack of knowledge of facts leaving him free to marry.
In a final category of cases, the presumption is relied
upon for holdings that impose liability which is strict
in the sense of not requiring at least "general intent."
See People v. Allen, 117 Ill. App.2d 20, 254 N.E.2d
103 (1969), concluding that since the defendant criminally invaded the victim's home and an injury to the
victim resulted, the defendant's conviction of battery
must stand since "everyone is held to comtemplate and
be responsible for the natural consequences of his act".
See also State v. Viekel, 2 Conn. Cir. 459, 202 A.2d
250 (1964), in which the court expressly acknowledged
that it was imposing liability for resisting arrest without regard to whether the defendant was aware of the
legality
of the attempted arrest.
23
See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1952). For a recent case holding a "strict liability" felony unconstitutional, see Speidel v. State, 460
P.2d 77 (Alas. 1969).
2 R. P Rxms, CRnaNAL

1969).

LAW 940-41 (2nd ed.

intent-is an equally obvious compromise.25 But
the M'Naghten formulation of the insanity defense28 is perhaps the most blatant. By restricting
the legal relevance of a defendant's psychological
abnormality to proof of a defect of his cognitive
abilities of such a nature as to render it impossible
for him to know the nature and quality of his act,
or to know that it is "wrong," the law formally
ignores much of the actual impact of psychological
27
abnormality upon an offender.
This brief discussion of the varying approach of
the substantive criminal law towards the competing models makes the doctrinal problem posed by
any attempt to integrate the psychological abnormality of offenders and the grading of criminal
liability clearer: although the law has sometimes
publicly embraced the proposition that there is no
guilt without an evil mind, substantive criminal
law doctrine in fact represents a series of varying
compromises between subjective and objective
models of liability. The extent to which guilt depends upon the offender's personal psychologyhis actual state of mind--differs with the crime
involved as well as the defenses asserted. Having
developed no consistent approach to the legal
relevance of the offender's psychology, the law is
understandably less than prepared to respond to
another demand to integrate the offender's state of
mind into the scheme for determining or grading
his criminal liability.
The purpose of this article is to examine the
actual or potential relationship of psychological
abnormality and the grading of liability. Before
examining the specific ways in which this might be
accomplished, the task undertaken in Part III,
it would be valuable to consider how courts have
formally responded to requests that they consider
psychological abnormality in some manner other
than raising the defense of insanity. This is the
subject of Part IL
II. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF
PSYcHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY
SHORT OF 'INSANITY"

As both the legal and the lay community have
gained psychological sophistication, attempts to
25
See People v. Hood, 1 CaL3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82
Cal.
26 Rptr. 618, (1969);
M Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (Lords 1843).
27 Some courts have failed to recognize that traditional formulations of the insanity defense do not
simply permit a defendant to convince the trier of fact
that he did not have the state of mind required for the
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1969); Smith v. State,

2d 313 (1969).

__

Miss._, 220 So.
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use psychological knowledge in assessing criminal
liability have increased. Given the rapid development of psychology, especially since World War
II, only relatively recent cases are of any real
value; the general language in the early cases
suggesting that such abnormality is properly a
factor in assessing criminal liability was written
under such different conditions than those now
existing that it deserves only minimal attention.
A. ConsiderationFavorable to the Use of Such Evidence
Those courts that have found evidence of psychological abnormality properly accepted and
consideredN have generally done so on the theory
that such evidence is relevant to the issue of the
defendant's state of mind. The leading case on this
point is the California Supreme Court's decision in
People v. Wells. 29 Wells, charged with an assault
"with malice aforethought," offered evidence that
at the time of the assault he was in a "state of
tension" and as a result had an abnormal fear for
his personal safety. Consequently, defense experts
28 Beckstead v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189
(1956) (Trial court erred in rejecting at first portion of
bifurcated trial evidence tending to show that defendant
lacked ability to form intent required for first degree
murder); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159
(1961) (Instruction that abnormal mental condition
might be considered in determining whether "specific
mental factor" existed "properly stated the law");
State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 385
(1964) (Trial court properly instructed jury to consider mental abnormality as going to whether defendant premeditated, but refusal to instruct jury to
consider this evidence as going to whether defendant
had general intent or malice aforethought also proper);
Washington v. State, 165 Neb. 275, 85 N.W.2d 509
(1957) (Error to instruct jury that evidence of low
I.Q. and "inferior thinking capacity and inferior judgement" would go to punishment only, since it could also
establish failure to deliberate and premeditate); State
v. De Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961) (Evidence of mental illness or deficiency admissible to
prove lack of premeditation if it rationally bears on that
issue); State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312
(1959) (Defendant entitled to jury instruction that
mental condition and defects could be considered in determining whether he had the power to deliberate);
Fox v. State, 73 Nev. 241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957) (Evidence of insanity may be used to show that although
the defendant was presumptively capable of premeditating he in fact did not, although it may not be
used to prove lack of capacity to premeditate), disapproving language in State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 70
P.2d 1113 (1937) to the contrary; State v. Green, 78
Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931) (In view of evidence defendant's abnormality, trial court erred in failing to
instruct on voluntary manslaughter, since mental illness can render one incapable of deliberating, premeditating, forming malice aforethought or forming
the intent to take life).
- 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
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submitted, Wells would fear for his personal safety
and react accordingly in situations in which a
"normal" person would not entertain any such
fear or would not entertain as great a fear.3 0
Commenting that if Wells had acted only on the
basis of honest (though unreasonable) fear he
necessarily would have lacked "malice aforethought," the court found the materiality of the
offered evidgnce "patent." 31Apparently assuming
that the determination of materiality settled the
issue, the court found error in the refusal to admit
the testimony. The Wells analysis is typical. Convinced of the logical relevancy of such evidence to
the state of mind issue, courts approving of its
use have not carefully examined objections to it.
Instead, they have jumped from logical relevancy to admissibility. 2
B. Jvdicial Rejection of Evidence of Psychological
Abnormality
Those courts that have rejected or disapproved
of use of evidence of a defendant's psychological
abnormality have generally been more extensive
in their explanation than courts approving such
use. Judicial discussions of this nature run the
gamut from expressions of broad fears of releasing
dangerous criminals to sophisticated analyses of
the charged offense which conclude that liability
is in fact objective.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on which a
decreasing majority has vigorously opposed the
use of evidence on psychological abnormality,n
30Id. at 344-45, 202 P.2d at 62.
11Id. at 345, 202 P.2d at 62-63.
12See cases cited in note 28 supra. The American
Law Institute recommended that evidence of a mental
disease or defect be admissible "whenever it is relevant
to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state
of mind which is an element of the offense." MODEL
PENAL CODE §4.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) The
comments, although acknowledging that some jurisdictions do not accord such evidence an admissibility
co-extensive with its relevance, do not discuss the
reasons for such limitations and simply conclude that
the drafters "see no justification for a limitation of this
;,, nts to "t02 (Tent.
kind." MODEL PENAL C "z,
Draft No. 4, 1955). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE §4.02(2)
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962), making evidence of
impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of the
act or to conform conduct to the law admissible when
the33issue is whether to impose the death penality.
Compare Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311,
218 A.2d 561 (1966) (4-3 decision) (Verdict of guilty of
first degree murder supported by evidence, and testimony that defendant lacked ability to form intent to
kill because of his mental state induced by feeling the
breasts of the victim or hearing her screams while
being beaten was not properly admitted as disproving
state of mind) and Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa.
265, 234 A.2d 540 (1967) (5-2 decision) (Medical testi-
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emphasized the increased danger to "law abiding
citizens" that would follow its use.U The Nevada
Supreme Court relied on the more specific objection that the use of such evidence could lead to
outright acquittal, in which case there would be no
procedural device available to assure protection of
society. Other objections relate to the type of
issues which use of such evidence would raise and
the type of testimony that would be used to resolve them. The opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, evince a strong distrust
of the reliability of expert mental health testimony
in general.

36

Courts have also urged that the issue would be
too complex to reasonably expect lay jurors to
resolve7 and, as a result, they fear that the issue
would be turned over to experts to decide, excluding both judge and jury from the decision-making
process."
Some courts in jurisdictions strongly attached
to the lkcNaghten formulation of the insanity
defense have seen the use of evidence of psychological abnormality as either inconsistent with the
insanity defense39 or rendered unnecessary by it.40
mony offered during first phase of bifurcated trial to
prove lack of ability to form intent to kill and to conform to the law properly refused) with Commonwealth
v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969) (Phelan
rule affirmed by equally divided court).
"Commonwealth v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 119-20,
253 A.2d 644, 651 (1969).
35Fox v. State, 73 Nev. 241, 244-45, 316 P.2d 924,
926 (1957). Provisions for automatic or quasi-automatic commitment following a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity serve this function upon such a final
disposition of a criminal trial. Similar provision might
be made, of course, for commitment following service
of a sentence imposed upon a finding of "reduced
guilt;"
see note 103 infra.
3

The insanity defense might be affected in one of
two ways. Evidence of lack of volition might be
received when it would not be admissible under the
jurisdiction's formulation of the insanity rule. Or,
carefully phrased requirements that only a total
or near-total loss of capacity to comply with legal
requirements would be subverted by permitting
proof of mere reduced capacity to comply. In either
case, the courts apparently have feared that use of
the evidence would subvert the resolution of the
conflicting interests which the insanity rule represents. On the other side of the coin is the argument
that the relevancy of the evidence is its tendency to
disprove the state of mind required for liability
and if the defendant lacked that state of mind, he
would also come within the insanity defense.4'
Under this view, the function served by a rule
permitting the use of such evidence is already
served by the insanity defense.
The Arizona Supreme Court took another approach in rejecting such evidence. The court,
considering the use of evidence of psychological
abnormality in a homocide case, affirmed a trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury to consider
such evidence in determining whether the defendant had the state of mind required for murder
(malice aforethought). The court relied upon a
statutory directive that malice "is implied when
no considerable provocation appears" 2 in concluding that the distinction was essentially objective.4
Thus the proof, which related only to the subjec241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957); State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz.
200,
40 403 P.2d 521 (1965).
See State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d

285 (1964). Cf. Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d
824 (1960) (Instruction that "a mind capable of know6See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, ing right from wrong is a mind capable of entertaining
535-36, 194 A.2d 911, 917 (1963). Although Carroll intent and of deliberating and premeditating" correctly
dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence, the attitude states the law).
41In State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d
expressed by the court in this case was clearly influen285 (1964), the court found no reversible error in a retial in the cases cited in note 33 supra.
fusal to instruct the jury to consider testimony as to
7Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 485 162 N.W.2d 77,
83 (1968): "Judge and jury ought not to be required to the defendant's "state of severe emotional turmoil" in
identify, classify and evaluate all categories and classi- regard to the defendant's state of mind. If the defications of human behavior beyond establishing the fendant lacked the capacity to harbor malice aforethought, the court concluded, he could also lack the
fact of sanity."
capacity to know right from wrong and therefore would
8Commonwealth v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 119, 253
A.2d 644, 651 (1969). See also Painter v. Common- be entitled to acquittal under the insanity instructions.
Id. at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290.
wealth, 210 Va. 360, 368, 171 S.E.2d 166, 172 (1969),
4 ARIz. Rlv. STAT. AiNw. §13-451(B) (1956).
asserting that permitting use of such evidence would
43People v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521
invade the province of the jury.
22 State v. Rideau, 249 La. 1111, 193 So. 2d 264 (1965). In an earlier case, the same court made even
(1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861 (1967) (Statute codify- clearer the objective nature of its view of homicide
ing M'Naughten requires rejection of evidence of liability. In Foster v. State, 37 Ariz. 281, 294 P.268
mental illness negating intent or reducing degree of (1930), the court emphasized that the power to reason,
crime); Commonwealth v. Rightnor, 435 Pa. 104, 253 or intelligence, did not affect the degree of a homicide
A.2d 644 (1969); Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 175
offense; if the accused is "sane," "the law implies deA.2d 24 (1961); State v. Fisko, 58 Nev. 65, 70 P.2d liberation and premeditation from the circumstances of
1113 (1937), disapprovedin part, Fox v. State, 73 Nev. the killing." Id. at 290, 294 P. at 271.
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underlying many such discussions is another deficiency that may to some extent help to explain
the inadequacies of the judicial analyses. This is the
frequent lack of apparent relevance of offered testimony to the allegedly applicable legal doctrine. It
is most obvious in cases in which psychodynamically-oriented experts testify in conclusory terms
circuit in 196044 adhered to its earlier view that
that a defendant lacks "intent" or in which the
such evidence would not be admissible. 45 Seeing the testimony is offered for the purpose, although the
underlying task as consolidating gradations of substance of the testimony is that the act was to
criminal responsibility and psychological abnor- some extent influenced by the unconscious operamality, the Court found the task inappropriate tion of defense mechanisms.
for judicial undertaking:
One of the best illustrations of this problem is the
47
much-criticized case of Fisher v. United States.
The problem of classifying, assessing and analyzFisher, a custodian, had assaulted and killed a
ing the results of the application of modern psylibrarian who had complained about the inadechiatry to administration of criminal law as it requacies of his work and called him a "black nigger"
lates to gradations of punishment according to the
in his presence. At trial,4s a clinical psychologist
relative intelligence of the defendant is beyond the
testified that Fisher had an I.Q. of 76. The defense
competence of the judiciary. Courts are neither
rested primarily, however, upon the testimony of
trained nor equipped for this delicate and imporErnest Y. Williams, M.D., a neurologist and psytant task. The basic framework for sentences of
punishment must be established by the legislative
chiatrist on the Howard Medical School faculty.
branch. Indeed, one can hardly conceive of a procDr. Williams testified that Fisher had a psychoess less suited to formulating general rules in this
pathic personality associated with chronic alcosensitive area, than an adversary proceeding. That
holism and early schizoic tendencies. He noted a
must be done by long range studies by competent
flattening of affect and limitations of information,
public and quasi-public entities and by legislative
judgment, and comprehension and testified that in
committees with trained staffs aided by objective
his
opinion Fisher had been unable to resist the
technical and scientific witnesses who can deal with
impulse to kill. He declined to respond categoriall aspects of the problem, not confined as we are
cally to whether Fisher was insane at the time of
to the facts of an individual case. 46
the killing. At one point, Dr. Williams made the
C. Evaluation
conclusory statement that "I doubt whether he
American case law evaluation of the relevance was able to entertain an intent to kill her." A
of evidence of a criminal defendant's psychological government rebuttal witness testified that an
deviation from the hypothetical rational man has individual of Fisher's mental age had eighty perbeen distressingly unsatisfactory. judicial discus- cent of normal intellectual function. The case
sion ranges from almost hysterical diatribes against appears to have been tried on an insanity theory,
mental health personnel in general to relatively de- although defense counsel did request instructions
tailed doctrinal analyses which ultimately conclude that the jury consider Fisher's entire personality
that the purported doctrinal requirement of a and his mental, nervous, and emotional characteristics in determining the existence of the state
subjective state of mind is in fact a fiction. But
of mind. On appeal, the District of Columbia Cir"4Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. cuit affirmed the denial of the instructions on the
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
45in Fisher v. T-v;l-- States, 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. alternative ground that there was no evidence
1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), the court had held justifying them. 9 On certiorari to the Supreme
that the jury was properly not instructed to consider Court, the government argued that even if such
psychological abnormality as disproving state of mind.
In Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. instructions were required in an appropriate case,
1954), the court was urged to reconsider the matter the evidence in this case was not of that degree of
but declined on the basis that a reevaluation should specificity that would enable the jury to determine
await some evidence of the effect of the expanded in47 328 U.S. 463 (1949).
sanity defense announced in Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4The
testimony is summarized in Transcript of
46 Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C.
Record at 83-95, Fisher v. United States, 32Q U.S. 463
Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
(1946).
49Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28,29 (D. C. Cir.
This view was adhered to in Stewart v. U,,ted States,
394 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
1945).
tive state of mind of the offender, was held immaterial.
The final objection raised to the introduction of
evidence relating to psychological abnormality
recognizes the full complexity of the entire matter.
Viewing the issue as involving more than a minor
evidentiary matter, the District of Columbia
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whether or not Fisher had the capacity to deliberate or premeditate.50 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court elected to treat the case as if there had been
extensive trial development of Fisher's capacity to
entertain the conscious desire to cause the victim's
death. The Court held that trial juries need not be
instructed to consider psychological abnormality in
determining the existence of premeditation.
The Court's treatment of the record as extensively developed on the issue of mental capacity
was ill-founded. While Dr. Williams' testimony as
to Fisher's limitations might have been related to
capacity to premeditate, no attempt was made to
develop this. The psychiatrist's statement that he
entertained doubt as to Fisher's ability to entertain
intent to kill was never explained or developed and,
as the record stood, remained an unsupported
assertion. Given the actual development of the
facts before the jury, it would have been quite
reasonable to resolve the case as the government
suggested-there was simply not sufficient information before the jury, qualitatively or quantitatively,
to justify having them determine the defendant's
capacity to entertain desire or awareness or to perform the evaluations necessary for premeditation.
Indeed, it is likely that the inadequate record in
Fisher affected the willingness of the Supreme
Court to resolve the issue. In Fisher, the defense
was really asking the jury to consider inability to
control conduct under the rubric of incapacity to
entertain the requisite state of mind. Given this
logical inconsistency between the testimony and
the theory under which it was offered, there is an
understandable basis for what might be regarded
as an inadequate judicial treatment of the issue.
The case law, then, has been characterized by a
failure to analyze carefully the substance of the
testimony offered or accepted, and, consequently,
by a failure to formulate and resolve the doctrinal
issues skillfully. Part III attempts a clarification of
this area by distinguishing among the principal
doctrinal vehicles under which evidence of a defendant's psychological abnormality might be
considered and broadly outlines the issues raised
by each.

abnormality. Consequently, the doctrinal issues
are seldom well-defined and evaluated. The first
task, therefore, is to distinguish carefully the alternative ways in which such evidence might be relevant to criminal liability. There seem to be four
alternatives. The evidence might go to establish a
general mitigating factor (the "partial responsibility" approach). It might go to establish the
absence of the state of mind required by the existing law defining the crime, either by proving inability to entertain that state of mind (the "diminished capacity" approach) or by proving that
despite the capacity to entertain that state of mind
the defendant did not in fact entertain it. It might
also tend to prove a lack of a causal relationship
between traditional mens rea and the act relied
upon to establish liability. Finally, the required
state of mind might be modified in a manner that
makes the psychological abnormality more meaningful, and the evidence would then go to the absence of this modified state of mind. To some extent these different doctrinal formulations of the
issues raise significantly different underlying policy issues. They must, then, be considered separately.

III. ALTERNATIVE WAYS IN WHIcH PSYCHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY MIGHT BE USED

"1See generally ROY.L CoinssioN ON CAPiTAL
PtGISHMENT 1949-53, REPOnT, App. 9, at 414-16
(1953) for a summary of the European provisions.
-2The Italian Penal Code, for example, permits a
sentence below the standard minimum for the offense
if, at the time of the offense, the accused was in such a
state of mind because of partial insanity that his
capacity for understanding and his volition were
greatly diminished. Id. at 415.
"English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11,
§2.

I-

ASSESSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

The case law, as Part H indicated, seldom evaluates critically the logical relevance of evidence
offered regarding a defendant's psychological
10Respondent's Brief at 36-38, Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946).

A. PsychologicalAbnormality as a MitigatingFactor
Based on the EuropeanModel
One means of relating a defendant's psychological abnormality to criminal liability is followed in a
number of European countries. 51 This alternative,
however, does not purport to relate directly the
elements of the offense and the reduction in responsibility, but gives the court or the jury the
power to reduce the penalty for the offense., Under the English Homicide Act of 1957, 53 a
similar approach is taken to liability for homicide
offenses, although the relevance of the abnormality
is not only the punishment but the formal grade
of the offense. A defendant may avoid conviction
for murder by reducing the degree of the offense to
manslaughter af he establishes that, at the time of
the crime, he was suffering from an "abnormality
of the mind" which "substantially impaired his
mental responsibility" in regard to the killing.

GEORGE E. DIX
Some American courts seem to have interpreted
offers of evidence of psychological abnormality as
arguing for the recognition of a similar doctrine in
this country. The District of Columbia Circuit, for
example, in assuming that the task before it would
involve "classifying, assessing and analyzing the
results of the application of modern psychiatry to
administration of criminal punishment as it relates
to gradations of punishment," " apparently anticipated that the use of psychological abnormality
would not be tied to existing gradations and definitions of offenses but rather would require a complete reworking of the grading of offenses. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that such a proposal has been
seriously proposed to American courts. The confusion is undoubtedly traceable, in part, to the fact
that courts are asked to use, in disproving state of
mind, evidence that simply does not logically
relate to the existing requirements for liability.
In any case, it is doubtful whether such an alternative could be easily integrated into the usual
framework of criminal liability. The general pattern of American criminal law does not lend itself
to simplified grading of offenses. In some limited
areas the task would not be extremely difficult. The
homicide offenses, for example, provide the basic
framework for several grades of criminal homicide
which could conceivably be differentiated by means
of subjective psychological factors, and this to some
extent is already done by the substantive law in
most jurisdictions. The existence of simple and
aggravated assault and battery crimes provides a
somewhat less wieldy possibility in that area. But
in general, there is not sufficient organization of the
statutory crimes to permit the application of a
general defense which has the effect of reducing the
grade of the offense. Those jurisdictions that have
revised their substantive criminal law and fit all
offenses into a limited number of gradations offer
better possibilities. 55 There would be little mechanical difficulty caused by simply providing that if a
defendant establishes that at the time of the
crime his responsibility was substantially impaired,
the conviction must be for an offense one grade
below what it would otherwise be.
But even under such favorable mechanical
conditions, such a step would cause difficulty.
One problem would be the relationship between
this doctrine and the "insanity" defense or its
equivalent which, if successfully asserted, com54
See text accompanying note 46 supra.
51See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE §55.05 (McKinney
1967).
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pletely absolves the defendant of criminal responsibility. 6 Related to this is the danger that such a
rule would run contrary to the function of grading
of offenses. Grading of offenses serves two purposes.
First, it differentiates among offenses on the
grounds of degree of blameworthiness which the
law attaches to the offense. Second, it differentiates
among offenses on the basis of the extent to which
punishment or incapacitation is necessary to
protect society from the offender or others potentially like him. Reducing the degree of the offense
because of psychological abnormality might appropriately reflect the reduced blameworthiness
which society attaches to the crime, but it would
also decrease the extent to which society could
look to the criminal system for protection. While
an offender who is psychologically abnormal may
well be less blameworthy, he may also be more
dangerous than one without his impairments. Thus,
to reduce the maximum period of incarceration to
which he may be subjected furthers one purpose of
legislative grading but is inconsistent with the
other. In this regard, the evidence of the offender's
psychological abnormality only highlights an inconsistency in the entire grading structure. But
special problems are raised by the inconsistency in
this context. The analogous problem raised by the
insanity defense has been resolved by automatic or
quasi-automatic "civil" commitment procedures
put into motion by a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. Such a solution cannot as easily be
engrafted onto a scheme in which the evidence of
psychological abnormality does not result in acquittal but merely in a reduction in liability. To
some extent this problem might be met by authorization to impose either noncriminal hospitalization or further incarceration in the criminal system
at the end of a sentence upon a finding of continued
dangerousness. But this is less than an entirely
satisfactory solution. For one thing, "fundamental
fairness" would probably be seen as endangered, if
not violated, by a scheme which imposed both
criminal punishment and noncriminal detention
for the same act. In addition, the problem of determining dangerousness at the end of a period of
imprisonment is such a difficult one that there is
doubt that it can be relied upon to protect both the
public interest in protection and the offender's
interest in minimizing the deprivation of liberty.
There is also the problem of determining what
characteristics or which psychological abnormali16 See text accompanying note 39 supra.

19711

DIMINISHED RFSPONSIBILITY

ties would be relevant to responsibility under such
an approach. This, of course, raises the objection of
many courts that to permit consideration of factors (such as impairment of volition) under this
rubric is to destroy the jurisdiction's insanity defense by the back door. In practice, of course, this
may be an artificial argument -the formal definition of the insanity defense may be of no effect
whatsoever upon trial court functions and results.5
But assuming that the doctrine is an important
matter, there is no necessary inconsistency. Insofar as a jurisdiction refuses to consider loss of
volition as giving rise to insanity because of the
difficulty of establishing it accurately and because
of doubts as to whether punishing even those without volitional control might prevent offenses by
others, an appropriate balancing of the competing
factors might well lead to the conclusion that the
risks would be worthwhile if the maximum effect
would not be acquittal but merely a reduction in
the grade of the offense.H
text accompanying note 14 supra.
'aThis is the approach that has been taken under the
English Homicide Act. In Regina v. Byrne, [1960] 2
Q.B. 396, the court rejected the suggestion that the
psychological abnormality that would justify reducing
murder to manslaughter under the statute meant the
same nature of abnormality as is required for the insanity defense under the M'Naghten rule, except that it
need not be as extreme as is required to successfully
assert a complete defense. To satisfy the requirements
of the Act, the court held, an accused must show "(a)
that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind,
and (b) that such abnormality of mind (i) arose from a
condition of arrested or retarded development of mind
was induced by disease or
causes,
anyand
inherent
or
(ii) was
such or
as substantially impaired his
injury
67See

mental responsibility for his acts in doing or being a
part to te klig." Id. at 43. "Abnormality of
mid" wa not defined as in M'Naghten, but rather was
held to mean only "a state of mind so different from
that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable
man would term it abnormal." Id. This, the court
made clear, was broad enough to include not only the
ability to perceive reality and form a judgment as to
whether an act is right or wrong, but also "the mind's
activities in all its aspect," including "the ability to
exercise will power to control his physical acts." Id.
Whether an impairment of self control substantially
impaired responsibility for the act, the court continued, is a question incapable of scientific proof. The
jury must approach the issue "in a broad, commonsense way" and should only be instructed that the
criterion involves "a mental state which in popular
language (not that of the M'Naghten Rules) a jury
would regard as amounting to partial insanity or being
on the border-line of insanity." Id. at 404.
In the particular case before it the accused had
killed a young girl and mutilated her body. The uncontradicted testimony of three defense experts was
that the accused was a "sexual psychopath," that he
suffered from perverted sexual desires which he found
it difficult or impossible to control, and that the killing

The problem of defining the showing necessary to
reduce the grade of the offense under such a system
also raises potential constitutional questions. If
the standard is phrased as generally as that in the
English Homicide Act,59 the statutory structure
might be subject to attack on grounds of vagueness. 60 To some extent, such a general formulation
offends the interests the preciseness requirement is
designed to protect. While it is unlikely that it
infringes upon a potential offender's right to advance notice of what constitutes an offense, it
arguably leaves the courts without sufficient guidelines to administer the defense. This, of course,
raises the danger of arbitrary administration and
unequal application. On the other hand, it seems
clear that preciseness is a matter of balancing
rather than an inherent characteristic of language.U
for which he was being tried had been committed under
the influence of these desires. After holding that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that the defense of diminished responsibility was not available on
these facts, the Queen's Bench substituted a verdict of
guilty of manslaughter for the verdict of murder, on
the ground that under proper instruction the jury
could have come to no other conclusion. Id. at 405.
How the doctrine has been applied in practice is not
dear. Wooton, Diminished Responsibility: A Layman's
View, 76 L.Q. Rav. 224 (1960) reports that in the first
twenty-seven months of operation the defense was
asserted in seventy-three cases. In fifty-three it was
successful. A previous history of mental disorder seems
to have most impressed juries, Lady Wooton reports,
and "other distinctions between the successful and the
unsuccessful cases are not easy to find." Id at 225-26.
This study, of course, does not address itself to what
effect the availability of the defense had upon cases
disposed of other than by formal trial.
On the basis of this study, Lady Wooton concluded
that the diminished responsibility approach of the
Homicide Act posed factual issues in individual cases
that were impossible to reliably resolve. Id. at 232.
After more extensive study, she adhered to this view.
B. WOOrON, CRImE AND TnE CRnINAL LAW 66 (1963).

H.L.A. Hart has agreed. See H.L.A.

HART, PUNISHmN,,T AND REsPoNsmlLrry 186-209 (1968), rejecting

Lady Wooton's argument that no state of mind should
be required for criminal liability but agreeing that because of the difficulties of proof, psychological abnormality should not be a factor in determining the existence of the state of mind. These arguments are, of
course, more sophisticated versions of objections that
have appeared in American case law. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
19See text accompanying note 53 supra.
10See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948).
61See the discussion by Justice Frankfurter, id. at
524-25 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 405 n. 8 (1966):
In so holding [that an authorization for a jury acquitting a person charged with nonfelonies to impose costs upon the defendant was void for vagueness] we intend to cast no doubt whatever on the
constitutionality of the settled practice of many
states to leave to juries finding defendants guilty
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law.

the existing doctrinal framework, the admission
and consideration of the evidence seems not only
to leave intact traditional criminal law principles
but also to be consistent with them. The law is not
only doing what it has always done, but it is doing
it better with the help of contemporary scientific
knowledge.
The basic question which this raises, which has
been almost ignored in the case law, is whether the
traditional state of mind rules are appropriate
vehicles for integrating contemporary psychological theories and criminal liability. There is no
reason why they necessarily should be. Although
the inens rea doctrine has a colorful history and has
undergone significant development,6 its present
framework was established long before the availability of the types of psychological explanations
for the behavior of particular offenders that are
now offered. There are several characteristics that
make the inens rea doctrine an inappropriate
vehicle for accommodating the new knowledge.
First, it is apparent that the traditional state-ofmind requirement is only one factor, and not
necessarily the most significant one, in grading
liability. Only in unusual situations, such as the
homicide offenses and assaultive crimes, are there
identifiable gradations based on the mental elements. Thus the grading pattern of most jurisdictions' substantive criminal law is such that offenses
are not uniformly graded by state of mind. In
addition, as Part I demonstrated, the various aspects of the mens rea rule and its corollaries are in
fact compromises between the objective and subjective models of liability. For this reason they may
be poor vehicles for the integration of psychological
abnormality into the grading scheme. As a matter
of doctrine, the requirement of an "evil mind"
does not always in fact cause liability to turn upon
the subjective state of mind of the offender. Not
only, then, does the traditional framework sometimes preclude inquiry into the subjective state of
mind, it is arguable that it does so for reasons unrelated to the purpose for which it would be used in
the diminished responsibility defense. For example,
those advocating consideration of psychological
abnormality frequently point to tic relevance of
intoxication to absence of state of mind. Yet does
this mean that psychological abnormality should be
usable to disprove "specific" intents but not "general" intents? Insofar as there is justification for

explain this choice. Id. at Comment to §503.

974 (1932).

In this context, there are strong arguments in
favor of permitting the law to proceed, feeling its
way as it goes, and formulating more precise
standards as the law becomes accustomed to the
subject matter with which it deals. This would also
provide flexibility for the rule to change as knowledge regarding the dynamics of antisocial behavior
improved. The vagueness issue is really a question
of whether the social interest in permitting the law
flexibility in this new area is outweighed by the
danger that abuse of this flexibility will operate to
the detriment of sDecific individuals. On balance,
the value of the flexibility seems to outweigh the
danger.
B. Psychological Abnormality As Proof of Nonexistence of TraditionalMents Rea

In American criminal litigation, psychological
abnormality is most often offered as bearing on
whether the defendant entertained the state of
mind required by the substantive law for liability.6 2
This, of course, is the most logically appealing
formulation. By tying psychological abnormality to
of a crime the power to fix punishment within
legally prescribed limits.
If there is more flexibility in defining the standard for
setting punishment than for imposing liability, it would
seem to follow that the distinctions between degrees of
liability would not have to meet the same standard of
precision as the standards for imposing any liability.
62 In 1917 the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology proposed that the sole legal rule relating to
criminal responsibility and mental illness be the following:
No person hereafter shall be convicted of any
criminal charge, when at the time of the act or
omission alleged against him, he was suffering from
mental disease and did not have by reason of such
disease the particular state of mind which must
accompany such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged.

Note, The Proposed Model Statute on Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility, 30 HAgv. L. REv. 179, 179

(1916) (criticising the proposal). See also Keedy, In-

sanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARv. L. REv.

534 Z1917) (defending it). Morris, Psychiatry and the
Dangerous Criminal, 41 So. CAL. L. Rmv. 514, 518-19

(1968), supports this position. This same suggestion
was recently served to the National Commini-ion on
Reform on Federal Criminal Laws by its consultant,
Professor David Robinson. Robinson, Consultant's Report on CriminalResponsibility-Mental Illness: Siction

503, AVORKINO

PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMISSION

oN REFORM OF rEDERAL CRiNAL LAWS (1970). The

Commission, however, rejected this formulation of the
general insanity defense in favor of a criterion turning
on substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of
conduct or to conform conduct to the requirements of
ON FEDERAL
R
NATIONAL COmI SION REFORm
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEw FEDERAL
CRMINAL CODE §503 (1970). The Comments do not

63See

generally Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HAstV. L. REv.
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limiting disproof of state of mind by intoxication to
specific intents, does such justification extend
equally to psychological abnormality?'
But even insofar as traditional doctrine does
make the offender's psychological condition at the
time of the offense a subject of inquiry, it arguably
requires the inquiry to be resolved by application
of criteria which bear little relationship to contemporary psychological knowledge. Aside from the
objection that this will lead to simply unsatisfactory results, this raises a preliminary danger that
in practice the doctrine and the testimony will
bear little or no relationship to each other. The
imms rea requirement is based upon assumptions
which, if not inconsistent with those of contemporary mental health personnel, at least do not provide them with a familiar framework. The basic
problem, therefore, is the same one that has traditionally plagued the M'Naghten formulation of
the insanity defense. The state of mind requirement is one of cognition or awareness 65 Mental
health personnel find it no easier to restrict their
comments to an offender's awareness when the
issue is the existence of a specific state of mind than
when the issue is the insanity defense. Some states
of mind do lend themselves to the type of analysis
that mental health personnel feel is appropriate.
"Premeditation" is one such state of mind, or,
more accurately, one such mental process. An example of satisfactory testimony as to the existence
of this process is the testimony offered in the trial
of Charles R. Starkweather for first degree murder.
A defense expert testified in that trial as follows:
[Ila the sense... we think of premeditation...

as considering an act, its possible consequences,
various alternatives,.. . he was not capable of
that; in the sense of proceeding from an impulse to
" The limitations upon the availability of intoxication as a defense represent a combination of fear that
drunkenness can be feigned, a desire to deter intoxication, moral judgments regarding the consumption of intoxicants, and a desire to secure protection against dangerous drunks, whether they meet the formal criteria for
criminal liability or not. But see the opinion of Chief
Justice Traynor in People v. Hood, I Cal.3d 444, 462
P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969), suggesting that the
distinction has a factual basis:
A drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do
something simple, such as strike another, unless he
is so drunk that he has reached the stage of unconsciousness. What he is not as capable as a
sober man of doing is exercising judgment about the
social consequences of his acts or controlling his impulses ton,-Ji antisncial acts.
Id. at 458, 462 P.2d at 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
11See text accompanying note 21 supra.

an action, in which the action is broken down into
separate stages, it is possible that he did that.
I believe that when he decides to do something, he goes ahead and does it. He may plan it;
it may be an act which takes a certain amount of
time, requires certain stages. In taking his car, he
has to think, "'Well, where can we stop and let them
off?" This is part of the planning. I don't think he
thinks of all these things at once, but as he goes
along he thinks of what he has to do next in order
to accomplish his intent.' 11
This testimony distinguishes between "intent" in
the sense of a conscious desire, "planning" in the
sense of considering the mechanical feasibility of
of effectuating that desire, and "premeditation"
in the sense of critically evaluating the pros and
cons of proceeding to effectuate the desire. It explains in understandable terms how a person could
logically entertain an intent, plan the effectuation
of that intent, but not premeditate regarding the
objective of that intent.
In contrast with this is the situation in the
Pennsylvania case of State v. Sikora.Y Sikora had
shot an individual with whom he had earlier had a
tavern dispute. He returned to his apartment following the dispute, loaded a gun, test-fired and
reloaded it, and left a note saying "The first bullet is for [the victim] and the second is for Stella
Miller." The defense testimony was relatively typical of the type dynamic psychiatrists offer in such
situations: Sikora had been subjected to numerous situations which increased his psychic tension,
including rejection by his girlfriend and the remarks made by the victim during the tavern dispute. The stress became so great that his personality responded with an unconscious defense
mechanism, a manner of dealing with stress on an
unconscious level determined by Sikora's individual personality history and development. When
his attention was directed to the functioning of
Sikora's conscious mind, the expert was somewhat
more vague: Sikora was "thinking," the expert
indicated, but "the thinking was automatic".
There were "strong elements of automatism"
present, and Sikora was not "fully conscious of his
activities" and not "completely aware of what he
was doing." He could not, the psychiatrist concluded, conceive the intent to kill.
The evidence in Sikora, like that in many other
cases, demonstrates the difficulty of using con- Starkweather v. State, 167 Neb. 477, 484, 93 N.W.
2d 619, 623 (1958).
'744 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965).
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temporary mental health personnel within the
framework of a rule that makes psychological
abnormality legally relevant to existence of actual
state of mind. The psychiatrist mouthed the magic
words that Sikora lacked the ability to form the
intent or to entertain the desire to cause death, but
a consideration of his testimony as a whole leaves
little doubt that this misstates his position. Sikora,
according to the expert, entertained a conscious
desire to cause the death of his victim and perhaps
considered acting on this desire to an extent sufficient to constitute premeditation. These conscious
mental states and processes, however, like the
actions of the defendant, were greatly influenced by
unconscious factors. Sikora did not lack the mental
state required for liability, but the mental state as
well as his actions was the result of unconscious
influences; this is the substance of the testimony in
Sikora and numerous other cases. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, which has been more alert
than most other courts to the discrepancy between
the proof offered in many cases and the matters at
issue under the applicable doctrine,6 held that the
proof was admissible only as going to sentence or
punishment.
If a person thinks, plans and executes the plan
at [the conscious] level, the criminality of his act
cannot be denied, wholly or partially, because,
although he did not realize it, his conscious was
influenced to think, to plan and to execute the plan
by unconscious influences which were the product
of his genes and his lifelong environment. 61
Other courts, however, which either did not see the
lack of logical relevance, or merely suspected it,
would likely be reluctant to exclude such testimony
on the ground that in a serious case the jury
"should" have a full picture of the defendant.
The danger that this state of affairs poses is this:

the use of psychological abnormality to disprove
intent is sometimes logically valid. Traditional
substantive criminal law doctrine, however, does
not make relevant many of the theoretical considerations which many feel should be taken into
account in determining whether to punish or how
much to punish. 'There is a strong tendency to
IsIn State v. Di Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401
(1961), the court approved of admission of evidence
of psychological abnormality which "rationally bears"
upon the existence of the state of mind required. This
language was relied upon in Sikora to emphasize that
the court took its doctrinal position in Di Paolo seriously and would require logical relevancy.
69State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470, 210 A.2d 193,
202 (1965).
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urge upon courts psychological explanations that
are simply not logically relevant to the issue for
which they are offered. The rule often, then, serves
as a fiction, a vehicle for placing a full dynamic
explanation of the offenders' behavior before the
trier of fact.7 ' This is not necessarily bad. It is
arguable that the jury's inherent power to acquit
or convict of lesser offenses (where mechanically
possible) will inevitably be exercised on the basis
of factors such as psychological abnormality. The
use of this fiction puts as much evidence before the
jury as possible and thereby maximizes the information on which the decision will be made. On the
other hand, failure on the part of many courts to
recognize that the rule often operates as a fiction
creates confusion in the appellate cases which is
likely to extend to the trial courtroom. In addition,
the necessity of observing the niceties of the fiction
prevents the court from assisting the jury in evaluating the evidence by appropriate instructions and
10To some extent, existing rules admitting such evidence are undoubtedly intentionally used as a fiction
to accomplish a result unrelated to the formal purpose
of the rule. Dr. Bernard L. Diamond has admitted as
much in discussing testimony which psychiatrists may
give under the California rule:
Actually, the law is not interested in... medical categorizing of who does or does not have malice
aforethought. What it wants to know is whether,
in the case of the particular individual on trial,
did the criminal action result from a voluntary,
deliberate choice such as normal, reasonable per-

sons appear to make in their daly lives, or was it
the result of pathological forces arising far below
the conscious level over which the defendant had
little power of control.

Diamond, With Malice Aforethought, 2 ARcHrvEs oF
CRnMNAL PsYcHoDYNAMcs 1, 29 (1957). Cf. Meyers,
The Psychiatric Determination of Legal Intent, 10
J. FoRENSIC SCIENCE 347 (1965), in which the author
dearly conceives of "legal intent" as including far
more than conscious awareness.
These comments apply directly to the psychoanalytically-oriented mental health professionals. See P.
87-88 (1958), for an
RocHE, THE CRnINAL Mn
exposition of the psychoanalytic or "dynamic" view of
"intent" and "motivation." Because of the law's preference for mental health experts with a medical background and the strong influence of psychoanalytic
theory upon the medical profession, psychoanalyticallyoriented psychiatrists are the primary source of testimony in criminal cases. There are, of course, other
theoretical orientation among mental health professions.
See generally U. NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 4-5
(1967). But the principal alternative, behavioral theory,
rejects (in its extreme views) any need or value to investigation of so-called mental processes. Id. at 5,
292-95. Cognitive psychology is directly concerned
with the processes between experience and overt behavior: perception, memory, problem-solving, and
thinking. Id. at 4. But little uf this work has reached
the point where it is of direct value to such complex
tasks as evaluating the mental processes of an offender
at a given past time.
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comments. Even "gut equity" might benefit by
the instructions or the summing up of an experienced trial judge.
Moreover, the use of the rule in this manner
makes it subject to what is probably the most
significant objection to the M'Naghte formulation
of the insanity defense: it unfairly places the burden of formally invoking the fiction upon the expert witnesses?' For the law to operate with such
a fiction, it would be necessary for expert witnesses
to mouth the "magic words," as did the psychiatrist in Fisher. To some extent, this creates discomfort on the part of the experts and dissatis7y2
faction among them with the legal process. It
thus works against the development of the "bridge
between medicine and the law" 78 which is essential to the adequate administration of any legal
rule which takes into account the psychology of
the offender.
C. Psychological Abnormality As Establishing a
Lack of a Causal Relationship Between Mens
Rea and the Act
Traditional criminal law doctrine requires not
only a state of mind and an act for liability, but
also a concurrence of these elementsY4 Concurrence in this context has been regarded as meaning
a causal relationship: to establish liability, the act
must be the result of the offender's state of mind 5
Although there has been no discussion of the relationship of this requirement to the offender's
psychological abnormality, the possibility seems
worth considering.
71

OYAL

CoMInssION

ON

CAPIAL

PUNISHMENT

1949-53, REx'oT 103-04 (1953):
[The burden of 'stretching' the M'Naghten
Rules, so as to avoid the unfortunate results of
their strict application, falls largely and unfairly
on medical witnesses.... It is unfair to the medical witness to place him in a position where he is
aware that his evidence as to the nature and degree
of the prisoner's mental disease and its effect on
his responsibility may be treated as irrelevant
unless he is prepared to hazard the opinion that at
the crucial moment the prisoner was probably
of the wrongfulness of his act.
unaware
72
Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally
Ill, 15 SrA. L. Rxv. 59 (1961). Diamond states, "I
don't like having to take refuge in such semantic devices." Id. at 62. '

73Id. at 51. The Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment concluded that relieving experts of the
embarrassment of the fiction would "do much to improve the quality of psychiatric evidence" offered in
insanity trials. ROYAL ComzsSioN ON CAPiTAL PUNismsxNT 1949-53, REPORT 104 (1953).
74

See generally R.
(2nd
7 ed. 1969).
5Id.
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Much of the testimony regarding psychological
abnormality received in those jurisdictions approving its use amounts not to a denial that the state
of mind required for liability did exist but rather
that factors other than the conscious desire or
awareness were influential in causing the criminal
conduct. While the "concurrence" requirement has,
in the few cases in which it has been raised, been
applied to situations in which the state of mind
and the act existed at different times, 76 there
is no reason why a state of mind that exists at the
time of an act and which might have "caused" the
act cannot be shown in fact, not to have caused
the act. The traditional concurrence requirement
could not, thereby, be established.
But this use of the concurrence requirement may
be little more satisfactory than the use of the state
of mind requirement itself. The concurrence requirement was formulated in a context far different from that of psychological abnormality, tending to show that actions were caused by factors
other than the conscious "will" of the actor. Traditionally, it has not been regarded as involving
the issue of volition, which has been relegated to
the insanity defense. The use of psychological
abnormality to disprove concurrence on the basis
that it is within the logic, if not the substance, of
the requirement is again subject to the objection
that the concurrence requirement is a poor vehicle
for grading offenses. Concurrence has traditionally
been an all-or-nothing proposition; either the state
of mind caused the act or it did not. To use this
as a vehicle for grading offenses, it would be necessary that to grade offenses according to the comparative role conscious intent played in causing the
act. Given the state of the clinical skills mental
health professions have to work with, it is doubtful
whether the law could administer a system that
required that offenders be so categorized.
On the other hand, such an approach would be
doctrinally easier to integrate with the insanity
defense in those jurisdictions in which volitional
impairment is a basis for the defense. An absence
of "substantial" capacity to control conduct (and
a corresponding "complete" domination by unconscious or mechanical factors) could give rise
to a complete defense to liability. A showing of
only a significant loss of control (or a significant
76
See, e.g., State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S.W. 825
(1886) (error to instruct jury in such a manner that
defendant would be guilty of murder even if he abandoned his intent to kill the victim before the victim
assaulted him).
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influence by unconscious factors) could reduce the
offense one grade (if offenses were graded generally).
D. Psychological Abnormality As Proof of Nonexistence of a Modified Mens Rea
If the traditional mens rea doctrines are inadequate vehicles for integrating the psychology of
the offender and the imposition of criminal liability, an alternative would be to modify the mens
rea requirement so as to make psychological assessment of offenders more meaningful. Several recent
developments bear upon this possibility.
1. Integrationinto M ens Rea of "Instrumentality"
William J. Chambliss, summarizing the deterrent
effect of criminal punishment, has concluded that
the research suggests that the effectiveness of
punishment depends upon two factors: the "instrumental" or "expressive" nature of the act,
and the degree of the actor's commitment to crime
as a "way of life." 77 If severe punishment is to be

imposed where it is most likely to deter, then, it
should be concentrated on those with little commitment to crime as a way of life and for whom
the criminal act is instrumental rather than expressive. Neither factor is formally integrated into
the substantive criminal law, although habitual
criminal statutes make some minimal attempt to
single out for more severe punishment those whose
commitment to crime has manifested itself in
several convictions. "The notion of intent,"
Chambliss correctly points out, "is not sufficient
to differentiate expressive and instrumental
acts." 71 "[Tihe possibility of doing so," he continues, "through a similar legal category is certainly not farfetched." 79

The suggestion that the mens rearequirement be
modified to distinguish between instrumental and
expressive acts raises numerous problems, however. Since it is largely a suggestion that a sophisticated notion of "motive" be integrated into mens
rea, it iF subject to the traditional criticism of
considering motive as a general matter. If "expressive" is broadly defined as meaning expressive
of a conscious or unconscious need, it would be
difficult or impossible in specific cases to draw the
line. In all cases, a crime is instrumental to some
extent, although the instrumental nature of some
77
Chambless, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness
of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 703, 712 (1967).
78Id. at 718.
79 Id.
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acts may be more obvious than that of others.
For example, the instrumental characteristic of the
act of the heir who kills to secure an inheritance
may be superficially clear, but is it really any
different in nature than the act of the latent homosexual who kills to reassert his masculinity? Both
acts are obviously instrumental but the goals
differ most significantly in their susceptibility to
proof.
Chambliss's suggestion would also be mechanically difficult to implement. Most statutory structures would not readily lend themselves to distinguishing between situations alike in all respects
other than that one involved an instrumental act
and the other an expressive act. Even those statutory schemes in which offenses are placed into a
limited number of categories do not seem to offer
significant possibilities. A rule that provided that
if the defendant established that his act was
"expressive" rather than instrumental the offense
would be one grade below what it would otherwise
be would seem to oversimplify the problem.
2. Minor Modifications of Existing State of M1find
Requirements: The CaliforniaExperience
An examination of the California homicide cases

since WTells85 suggests that the states of mind required for the homicide offenses in that jurisdiction
have been undergoing significant changes. It is
likely that this represents the effort by the California Supreme Court to integrate the substantive
law with the evidence regarding the dynamics of
offenders' behavior. Such evidence was coming
before the courts in greater quantities after Wells.
This effort potentially holds valuable lessons for
the use of psychological abnormality in the homicide area for other jurisdictions and in offenses
other than homicide in California as well as elsewhere.
The first major development following Wells was
People v. Gorshen,& decided in 1959. Although the
court affirmed the conviction of Gorshen for second
degree murder, the court in dicta made clear that
8 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
836 (1949). See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
151 Cal.2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), affirming 326
P.2d 188 (Cal. \pp. 1958). In People v. Baker, 42 Cal.
2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954), the court had found error
in an instruction that the defendant in a homicide
trial was conclusively presumed "sane and of sound
mind," since this told the jury not to consider evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation and epilepsy in
determining his ability to premeditate and deliberate.
This, however, was a necessary result given Wt'.', and
represents no significant expansion.
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the evidence of Gorshen's mental illness had been
properly received as proving lack of malice aforethought. But the opinion shows the beginnings of
a recognition of inconsistency between the testimony admitted under the Wells rule and the substantive law governing the degrees of criminal
homicide. First, voluntary manslaughter was
defined under California law (as under the law of
many states) as an intentional killing committed
82
upon a "sudden quarrel or heat of passion"
which had been held to require reasonable provocation.83 This seemed to preclude use of voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser offense if lack of malice
aforethought was proven. The court solved this
doctrinal dilemma by creating a "new" category
of voluntary manslaughter, defined simply as an
unlawful killing without malice aforethought. The
distinction between this category of voluntary
manslaughter and murder, unlike the distinction
between traditional voluntary manslaughter and
murder, is subjective.
The subjective criterion to be applied, however,
obviously caused the court some concern. The
testimony at trial had been essentially as follows."9
Gorshen, a longshoreman, had been severely
schizophrenic for many years, and because of his
hallucinations often came precariously close to
psychological collapse. As he lost his sexual powers,
his work as a longshoreman took on unconscious
symbolic value as proof of his manhood. When the
victim, Gorshen's foreman, asked Gorshen to
leave work because of his drinking, this seemed to
Gorshen's unconscious to be a deprivation of
sexual normalcy and powers. Gorshen's unconscious reacted to this threat to his sexual powers by
causing him to strike back violently at the source
of the threat. Although the expert witness testified
C . PENAL CoDE §192(1) (West 1970). Evidence
C2

of provocation not sufficient to reduce a killing from
murder to homicide had been earlier held relevant to
the determination of whether the defendant had the
intent to kill and whether he acted following premeditation. This, however, had the effect only of reducing
the offense to second degree murder. People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 (1946). Prior cases had,
however, recognized that intoxication might disprove
the existence of malice aforethought and reduce the
offense to manslaughter. People v. Chesser, 29 Cal.2d
815, 178 P.2d 761 (1947). This implied recognition of a
category of voluntary manslaughters other than those
amounting to reductions by virtue of provocation.
8See, e.g., People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d. 121, 13644, 169 P.2d 1, 11-15 (1946). But cf. Coshow, Classiication of Homicide Law in California from Recent Decisions, 1 HASTINGs L. J. 32 (1950).
84People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716, 722-23, 336
P.2d 492, 495-96 (1959).

conclusorily that Gorshen did not have the mental
state required for malice aforethought or premeditation "or anything which implies intention, deliberation or premeditation," he did not specifically
controvert Gorshen's own testimony that at the
time of the shooting he entertained the conscious
desire to shoot the victim. Apparently, the court
resolved this logical inconsistency between the
testimony and the substantive law, under which
an intent to kill or inflict serious bodily injury
suffices for malice aforethought, by tacitly approving the definition of the "medical essense" of
malice aforethought which the medical expert was
permitted over objection to give at trial: malice
aforethought exists when "'an individual performs
an act as a result of his own free will or intentionally,'" as opposed to those situations in which
"'the action is directly attributable to some abnormal compulsion or force, or symptom or diseased process from within the individual.' "85
This, of course, makes the state of mind a volitional concept, and flies in the face of traditional
state of mind doctrine. The court did not expressly approve the "medical" definition and in
fact declined to "undertake the task of formulating
an inclusive or comprehensive definition of malice
aforethought." 88 Yet acceptance of the substance
of this definition seems the only way in which the
court could have found the medical testimony
logically relevant. After this extensive doctrinal
discussion, however, the court concluded that the
trial judge had reasonably disregarded the expert
testimony and that the conviction for second degree murder was supported by the evidenceY
The conflict between the psychological testimony
received under the Wells rule and the substantive
law was presented more directly in 1964 in People
v. Wolff.P Wolff, a fifteen year old youth, had
killed his mother pursuant to a bizzare plan to
rape or photograph nude a number of girls. The
plan required that his mother be gotten "out of
the way." There was expert testimony that Wolff
was khizophrenic. The jury, however, rejected the
insanity plea. The court convicted Wolff of first
degree murder and imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment. The California Supreme Court
found support for the jury finding of legal responsibility but held that Wolff, by virtue of his youth
"IId.at 723, 336 P.2d at 496.
81Id.at 730 n. 11, 336 P.2d at 501 n. 11.
8Id.
at 736, 336 P.2d at 504.
8861 Cal.2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271
(1964).
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and psychological abnormality, was not capable of
the mental processes first degree murder requires.
In so holding, the court significantly altered the
substantive definition of premeditation. Drawing
upon prior assertions that the extent of the reflection upon the contemplated crime is the benchmark of first degree premeditation, the court held
that the defendant must "maturely and meaningfully" reflect upon the gravity of the contemplated
act.89 "Maturely and meaningfully" was defined
functionally by observing that the degrees of
murder are designed to distinguish among offenders
according to their "quantum of personal turpitude" and "personal deprivaty." 90Although Wolff
had apparently reflected upon the killing of his
mother to the full extent of which he was capable,
he failed to realize the enormity of the evil and
the consequences of the act. His conviction was
therefore modified to second degree murder.
People v. Conley 9' presented the same question
in regard to the distinction between murder and
voluntary manslaughter, the "malice aforethought" issue with which Wells had dealt. Conley
had killed his girl friend and her husband after a
period of extensive drinking. In addition to Conley's own testimony that he did not intend to kill
the victims and that he did not remember doing
so, the defense introduced evidence that the
amount of alcohol he had consumed would impair
the judgment of an average person and, through
a psychologist's testimony, that he "was in a
dissociative state at the time of the killings and
because of personality fragmentation did not function with his normal personality." 92 The California Supreme Court reversed the convictions
for first degree murder on the ground that the
trial court had erroneously failed to instruct the
jury on manslaughter. In the course of its discussion, the court developed the concept of malice
aforethought in a manner similar to that accorded
premeditation in Woff. "An awareness of the
obligation to act within the general body of laws
regulating society," it held, is implied in the statutory definitions of malice aforethought, even
though it is not necessary that the defendant
know that his particular act is prohibited.93 "If
because of mental defect, disease, or intoxication
89Id. at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
90 Id.at 820, 394 P.2d at 974-75, 40 Cal. Rptr. at
286-87.
9164 Cal.2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1966).
2
9 Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
93Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
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...the defendant is unable to comprehend his duty
to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law, he does not act with malice aforethought," 94 the court declared, pointing to Gorshen
as evidence that a killer might act with intent and
premeditation but not with malice aforethought.
In the recommended instructions for such cases,
the court directed that the jury be told that to
have malice aforethought, a defendant must have
the ability to comprehend the legal prohibition
against endangering the lives of others and his
obligation to conform his conduct to this stand95

ard.

In a number of cases following Wolff, the California Supreme Court reduced convictions of first
degree murder to second degree on the ground
that the evidence failed to sustain a finding of
premeditation within the Wolff definition." These
cases were followed, however, by several cases in
which the court treated evidence of psychological
abnormality with much less sympathy.9 In People
v. Morse,98 for example, the court held that despite
Conley, the trial court had not erred in refusing
to instruct on voluntary manslaughter in a trial
concerning a killing committed on death row.
There was expert testimony that once the assault
began, the killing was automatic and instinctual,
and that because of a personality disorder Morse
lacked "the capacity to think in terms of usual
values of morality. He [was] without the ability,
in other words, to think in moral terms." 99 Holding that this did not even raise the issue of his
" Id.
95rd. at 324 n. 4, 411 P.2d at 920 n. 4, 49 Cal. Rptr.
at 824 n. 4.
91 People v. Bassett, 69 Cal.2d 122, 443 P.2d 777,
70 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968); People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal.2d
866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967); People v.
Goedecke, 65 Cal.2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr.
625 (1967); People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 416 P.2d 132,
52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
17 In addition to Morse, see People v. Bandhauer, 1
Cal.3d 609, 463, P.2d 408, 83 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1970)
(First degree murder conviction affirmed despite evidence of severe neurosis, mild to moderate paranoia,
personality disorders, chronic alcoholism and psychomotor epileptic seizures when the alcohol in the accused's blood reached a certain level); In re Kemp, 1
Cal.3d 190, 460 P.2d 481, 81 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1969);
People v. Risenhover, 70 Cal.2d 39, 447 P.2d 925, 73
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1968) (Emphasis placed on expert
testimony that accused was not "psychotic" and that
his capacity for deliberation was not below average, an
apparently rational motive for the crime, the rational
method of varrying the crime out, and lay testimony
that nothing unusual was observed about accused).
9870 Cal.2d 711, 452 P.2d 607, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1967).
99Id. at 733 n. 15, 452 P.2d at 620 n. 15, 76 Cal.
Rptr. at 404 n. 15.
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capacity to entertain malice aforethought, the
court noted that there was a lack of proof concerning whether Morse lacked the awareness that his
action was contrary to law and, surprisingly,
stated that mere incapacity or disinclination to
obey law by virtue of personality disorder cannot establish lack of malice aforethought. These
later cases resemble the treatment given the matter
by the lower California appellate courts, which
have generally been unwilling to second-guess
trial courts' conclusions on the issue0 0°
How should the California experience be evaluated? First, it seems clear that the extensive use
in trial courts of the Wells doctrine convinced the
California Supreme Court that the traditional
formulations of the state of mind requirements for
homicide offenses were not adequate vehicles for
using evidence of psychological abnormality. The
objective distinction between murder and manslaughter that fell in Gorshen was the most obvious
barrier. Wolff and Conley, however, represent
attempts to modify the states of mind required
for first and second degree murder. In both, however, the court spoke in cognitive terms: reflection,
understanding of the act, comprehension of the
legal prohibitions and the obligation to conform.
This does not seem to have provided a very satisfactory vehicle for expert testimony. The experts
speak in general terms of "disassociation" and
impaired consciousness, but seem unable to be
precise on the actual cognitional processes of the
defendant. The experts talk in terms of conscious
and unconscious factors in reacting to stress, and
seem to feel little more comfortable under Wolff
and Conley than under M'Naghten.
The California rule is subject to the criticism
that in practice, as far as can be determined, it
emphasizes relatively superficial factors and detracts, therefore, from a sophisticated use of psychological insight. As the California Supreme
Court has dealt with the rule, the cases have
turned on such factors as youth, the presence of
00See People v. Caylor, 259 Cal. App.2d 191, 66
Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968); People v. Juarez, 258 Cal.
App.2d 344, 65 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1968). See also People
v. Moore, 257 Cal. App.2d 740, 65 Cal. Rpt. 450
(1968) (upholding a conviction for second degree
murder despite the absence of prosecution evidence on
diminished capacity); People v. Hokie, 252 Cal. App.2d
901, 61 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967) (Conviction for assault
with intent to commit murder upheld despite evidence
of psychological abnormality). In People v. Muszalski,
260 Cal. App.2d 611, 67 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1968), it was
held not prejudicial error in a pre-Conley trial to fail to
give instructions on the Wells rule despite defense
evidence of psychological abnormality.

stereotyped symptoms of mental illness, the bizarre
nature of the crime, or the existence of an apparent
rational motive. It is no coincidence that many of
the cases involved killings of family members by
other family members--Conley involved a quasifamily situation. To some extent this undoubtedly
represents the view stated by one of the experts
in People v. Nicolausln1 that anyone who kills his
own children without provocation is not legally
responsible, whether the test is "sanity" under
M'Naghten or ability to premediate under Wolff.
Is this oversimplification inherent in the approach taken by the California Supreme Court,
or is it rather the cautious early application of a
doctrine that has the potential for more sophisticated application? It is probably inherent in the
court's approach. Despite the effort the court has
expended, it has gone no further than to develop
the cognitive aspects of the state of mind requirements. Although the discussions in Wolff and
Conley circle around problems other than those
things within the conscious awareness of the defendant, they ultimately come to rest upon a rule
phrased in traditional cognitive terms. The opinions give the impression that the underlying basis
for the decisions is something other than the scope
or intensity of the defendants' conscious awareness, but the court was unwilling or unable to
justify the decision in terms of these other factors.
In Morse, moreover, the court apparently recognized and disclaimed the glimmerings of a more
expansive revision of the state of mind requirements.
This is not to say that the ameliorating effect of
Gorshen, Wolff and Conley is not appropriate where
it applies. It does not, however, provide a satisfactory vehicle for doctrinal analysis of more complex and sophisticated problems, such as the degree of liability which the law should attach to
Morsel

The California development of the homi-

10165 Cal.2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1967).
02
1 Cf. the problem posed by Professor Norval Morris
in Morris, Psychiatryand the Dangerozs Criminal41 So.
CAL. L. R.v. 514 (1968):

It is too often overlooked that one group's exculpation from criminal responsibility confirms the
inculpation of other groups. Why not permit the
defense of a dwelling in a Negro ghetto?... [Aidverse social and subcultural background is statistically more criminogenic than is psychosis; like insanity, it also severely circumscribes the freedom
of choice which a nondeterministic criminal law
(all present criminal law systems) attributes to
accused persons.
By phrasing the issue as the availability of the "defense of living in a ghetto," Morris confuses the prob-
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cide states of mind represents a valiant effort, but
not one that seems to hold much promise for a
general integration of gradation of criminal liability and psychological abnormality.
IV.

EVALUATION OF THE ATTEMPT TO INTEGRATE

THE GRADING OF OFFENSES AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY OF THE OFFENDER

Given the problems caused by attempts to
integrate the psychology of the offender and the
degrees of criminal liability in practice and others
that can be anticipated from more extensive
efforts, l0 3 is the task worth while? In part, this is
merely a restatement of arguments that have long
been made regarding the insanity defense and the
entire concept of mens rea. But they are worth
restating here.
Several argument.- can be made for making
such attempts. First, doctrinal consistency demands it. The law requires defined states of mind.
If psychological abnormality of some type is
logically inconsistent with these states of mind,
fairness and logic demand that such abnormality
be the subject of legal investigation. Second, psylem. There is no defense of "psychosis." In both cases
the isue is the effect of the factor upon the individual's
psychology. Either psychosis or physical environment
might affect an individual's psychological functioning
so as to have some impact upon his criminal liability.
But if the law seeks to determine the less blatant
effects of such factors as ghetto living upon an offender's
psychology and tlen integrates it into his criminal liability, it is necessary to have a doctrinal vehicle which
not only makes the investigation relevant but integrates it into the scheme for determining and grading
criminal liability in a manner which furthers the policy
objectives of the criminal law. Use of the insanity defense, of course, may flounder upon restrictive (and
probably unrealistic and indefensible) definitions of
"mental illness." For present purposes, the issue is
whether there is another doctrinal way of accomplishing this.
103There are several problems beyond the scope of
this discussion which are probably not insurmountable.
One is the problem of combining admissibility of psychol.gical abnormality for purposes other than establishing the complete defense of insanity and "split trial"
procedures. See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d
715 (1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3313 (U.S. Jan.
18, 1971) (Dictum that split trial procedure did not
permit evidence of "insanity" to be introduced as to
state of mind and therefore violated due process). A
trial could easily be split so as to separate factual issues
,ther than those relating to state of mind from those
that do relate to state of mind, whether state of mind
goes to insanity, grade of offense, mitigation, or any
other matter. The problem of a possible justification for
preventive detention, following service of a prison term
(see text accompanying note 35 supra) could be readily
solved by invoking existing authority for "civil" hospitahzation. Prior ciminal acts would certainly be
relevant to a subject's present dangerousness.
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chological abnormality bears on "personal turpitude," and the law, if it is to maintain the community's respect, must grade its condemnation
according to the moral turpitude of the offender
as the community evaluates it. The need to have
criminal law accurately express community condemnation therefore requires this investigation.
Third, a humanitarian argument can be made
that consideration of psychological abnormality
minimizes the penal sanctions imposed upon those
who, as a group, need "treatment." Although it
does not, as the insanity defense does, release them
immediately for "treatment," it does minimize
the extent to which treatment must be postponed
to permit the law to extract its vengeance. Fourth,
consideration of psychological abnormality seems
a logical corollary to the utilitarian premises of
the criminal law: punishment must be justified by
crime prevention, and the imposition of severe
punishment upon the psychologically abnormal is
not so justified. Consideration of psychological
abnormality would help restrict the imposition of
punishment to those cases in which it can most
likely be expected to achieve its preventive effect.
Finally, formally recognizing the relevance of
psychological abnormality would amount to a
realistic accommodation of the inevitable.' Triers
of fact will continue to be confronted with the
formal all-or-nothing choice of the insanity defense in cases where any reasonable man would
seek a compromise. Rather than ignore this situation, the law would best serve its goals if it recognized the relevance of the psychological abnormality short of insanity and used formal doctrine to
10There is some evidence of the effect of such a
change in the experience following the enactment of
the English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11,
§2, which made available a limited defense of diminished responsibility. See text accompanying note 53
supra. 1 N. WALxER, CRanE AND INsANITY IN ENGLAND:
THE HISTORICAL PzlsPECTVE 158-59 (1968), studied
murder trials from 1957 through 1963. His results suggest that the increasingly large number of defendants
found guilty of manslaughter under the diminished
responsibility rule developed at the expense of a reduced number of successful insanity defenses and, to a
lesser extent, a decreased number of findings of incompetence to stand trial. This may mean that triers of
fact were previously returning verdicts of not guilty
in regard to defendants who were not in fact within the
insanity criterion. If so, the rule increases the rationality
of the system and maximizes the opportunity for the
formal doctrine to helpfully guide actual practice.
On the other hand, if the doctrine causes triers of
fact to find a lesser degree of criminal guilt in regard
to defendants who are in fact legally entitled to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, it can scarcely
be said to be an improvement over the pre-1957 situation. Clearly more investigation is needed.
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assist the trier of fact in considering such abnormality in a manner most consistent with the
objectives of the criminal law.
On the other hand, it can be argued that a
realistic evaluation of criminal law doctrine reveals
that the so-called state of mind requirement is
essentially a fiction. Doctrinal consistency does
not require investigation of psychological abnormality, at least to the extent contemplated by some
of the advocates. Nor does the need to have the
criminal law reflect community judgments regarding morality require it. It is doubtful whether the
community attaches much importance to the
distinctions between degrees of liability, assuming
that acquittal by reason of insanity does represent
a community judgment of a lack of moral culpability. Further, it is doubtful whether community
evaluations of moral culpability, whatever their
contents, turn upon the type of distinctions which
experience shows are considered if psychological
abnormality is made the subject of investigation.
Finally, assuming that there is a substantive
difference between incarceration resulting from
criminal conviction and other forms of treatment,
considering psychological abnormality as a factor
in grading the offense is an inefficient method of
giving effect to a humanitarian desire to maximize
the opportunity of the mentally ill to have treatment. Outright acquittal serves this function
much better. The opportunity for transfer from
correctional to mental health facilities after conviction and imprisonment accomplishes the same
thing although it is probably less efficient.
Furthermore, it can be argued that insofar as
imposing punishment serves to reinforce the community's prohibitions against criminal acts, minimizing the culpability of offenders by reducing
the condemnation formally accorded their acts
may ultimately reduce the effectiveness of the
standard in preventing others from offending.
Thus, consideration of psychological abnormality
for this purpose is subject to the same objections
as a broad general insanity defense. On a more
mechanical and perhaps practical vein, it might
well be doubted whether the task of making the
judgments required by a sophisticated rule which
grades offenses in part by psychological abnormality is within thc power of present triers of fact,
015
given the quality of expert assistance available.
105See text accompanying notes 37, 38 supra, raising
the objections in the American cases, primarily in the
context of the "diminished capacity" approach and
accompanying note 58 supra, discussing the difficulties

As the Sirazan case illustrated, the dispute is likely
to leave a jury with little else to do but guess.
No matter how doctrinally sound, an inquiry
which is not mechanically feasible is scarcely a
good investment of time and effort.
Nor does it necessarily follow that consideration
of psychological abnormality is consistent with
utilitarian policy. There is a lack of evidence that
psychological abnormality renders an individual
significantly less subject to the preventive function of the threat of criminal punishment. In fact,
even if the assumptions of the psychodynamic
psychologists are accepted, it is still reasonable to
expect that the unconscious may be influenced
by the experience that those who commit antisocial
acts are punished.
On balance, the arguments in favor of considering psychological abnormality seem persuasive.
Whatever the present limitation on accurately
determining the psychological dynamics of particular offenders, the situation is likely to improve
with practice. Mental health professionals, engaged
in the treatment process, seldom have the opportunity to speculate concerning the mental processes
of an offender as they relate to the criminal law.
If the law expects such professionals to be of more
help than they have been in the past, it must
provide the opportunity for them to practice
their analysis. Perhaps this is where the greatest
value of the concept lies: it encourages courts,
the general public, and mental health personnel to
address themselves not only to broad questions
of crime prevention and general philosophical
issues related to punishment, but also to the problem of the specific offender and what should be
done in "this case." From continued experimentation in this area, it is reasonable to expect the
development of a more sophisticated ability to
analyze particular cases as well as the development of a body of knowledge on which to build a
more realistic substantive criminal law.
But the traditional state of mind requirements
are not suited to serve as the vehicle for integration
of criminal liability and psychological abnormality.
Nor is there any apparent way of modifying or
replacing the traditional state of mind doctrine
with a more appropriate alternative. The best
solution would probably be to authorize a trier
of fact to find, in addition to guilt, that the defendant was suffering from a psychological abencountered with the "diminished capacity" approach
under the English Homicide Act.
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normality at the time of the offense which substantially reduced his culpability for the crime. If
such a finding were to be returned, the sentencing
authority should be required to take it into account and to impose a sentence less than the
maximum authorized for the offense. Culpability
should be defined for the trier of fact in terms of
ultimate blameworthiness, encompassing both
cognitive and volitional factors. This would per-
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mit the trier of fact to follow instructions regarding
traditional state of mind requirements, and at the
same time assure him that a conclusion about
psychological abnormality would have some concrete effect upon the future of the offender. Ideally,
perhaps, psychological abnormality should affect
the formal liability imposed rather than the
punishment, but given the inadequacies of the
present doctrine, this is an unrealistic goal.

